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ABSTRACT  
Behavioral control theory attempts to explain how controllers can ensure controlees work towards controller goals.  
Prior studies underinvestigate organizational self-control, and produces mixed results.  This paper theorizes and 
elaborates on the construct of organizational self-control, and how controllers can encourage controlees’ 
organizational self-control.  Organizational self-control differs from “personal” self-control in that organizational 
self-control focuses on getting another individual (e.g., employee) to exert self-control to perform a controller’s task.  
Consonant with the personal self-control literature, we argue organizational self-control comprises (self) goals, (self) 
monitoring, and willpower.  We further argue organizational self-control is a mediator between external controls 
(formal and clan control) and controlee performance.  While the literature considers external controls’ influence on 
one’s goal and self-monitoring, it does not consider external controls’ impact on willpower.  We demonstrate 
through a case study in product development that how control is enacted can impact willpower positively, leading to 
positive control outcomes. 
Keywords 
Organizational self-control, willpower, project, behavioral control theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral control theory, principally developed in the non-routine/temporary IT project context, provides a 
framework for studying project controls (Kirsch 1996; Kirsch 1997).  However, despite there being much research 
progress in behavioral control theory, little research is done on self-control in organizations.  The context differs 
from that of typical self-control research as self-control in organizations is about accomplishing others’ goals (i.e., 
controllers’).  In organizational self-control, the  controller “activates” controlee self-control to achieve controller 
goals.  In traditional self-control, the goals (e.g., quitting smoking) are personal (Tangney et al. 2004).  However, 
research on organizational self-control generates mixed results (Kirsch and Cummings 1996; Maruping et al. 2009).  
This paper aims to deepen our understanding of organizational self-control.  We borrow from the psychology and 
marketing literature on self-control and propose a preliminary definition of organizational self-control and a model 
of the relationship between other controls and organizational self-control.  We then perform a case study to illustrate 
how formal control is applied and enacted as organizational self-control.   
This paper’s principal contribution is a revised organizational control model.  In the model, organizational self-
control comprises three dimensions: (self) goals, (self) monitoring, and willpower.  It mediates effects of formal and 
clan controls, and non-control factors on controlee performance.  We theorize how and why formal/clan controls can 
be applied to enhance organizational self-control via two routes: (1) relaxing redundant controls, and (2) removing 
willpower drains.  The model argues external controls impact self-goals, ability to monitor, and willpower.  
Organizational self-control occurs when goals and monitoring align with controller desires, and when external 
controls remove drains on controlees’ willpower, thereby enabling self-control.   
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Control refers to controllers’ attempts to ensure controlees act according to predefined strategies to achieve 
organizational objectives (Kirsch 1997).  Two principal control modes exist: formal and informal control.  Formal 
control relies on controllers’ hierarchical authority to monitor/evaluate/reward controlees.  There are two “sub” 
modes of formal control: behavior and outcome control (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1997).  Behavior control 
prescribes rules and procedures.  Controlees are rewarded/punished, depending on how faithfully procedures are 
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followed.  Outcome control prescribes desired outcomes/goals and controlees are rewarded/punished for 
meeting/failing goals.   
Informal control is noted by the absence of hierarchical authority to monitor/evaluate/reward.  There are two “sub” 
modes of informal control, clan and organizational self-control (Kirsch 1996).  Clan control refers to proscriptions 
of behavior based on rituals, ceremonies, and shared experience, with emphasis on emotional relations of unity and 
solidarity with the organization or colleagues (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007; Ouchi 1980).  Organizational self-
control refers to the self’s proscriptions of behaviors.  It is self-chosen and carries connotations of individualism and 
self-actualization (Ryan and Deci 2000; Wiener et al. 2015).   
Little research on organizational self-control exists.  Organizational self-control is recognized as a critical control 
mode (Kirsch and Cummings 1996).  Yet, most research elects not to analyze it (Soh et al. 2010).  Our 
understanding of it is lacking. 
Organizational Self-control 
The organizational self-control literature is scant, and empirical phenomena are not well explained by theory.  For 
example, drawing from agency theorists (Eisenhardt 1985), Kirsch (1996) theorizes organizational self-control as 
most appropriate when formal control is difficult to apply or when tasks rely on individual judgment.  However, her 
empirical results demonstrate organizational self-control is best applied under the same situations as behavior 
control  (Kirsch and Cummings 1996).  Maruping et al. (2009) argue organizational self-control facilitates project 
coordination but  find it detrimental to project coordination.   
A similar concept of self-control exists in the psychology/marketing literature.  To differentiate this literature from 
organizational self-control, we call this the personal self-control literature.  The personal self-control literature 
focuses on one attempting to better oneself (e.g., quitting smoking), not about controlees performing actions 
beneficial to controllers.  Nevertheless, mechanisms required are similar.  Thus, we propose organizational self-
control comprises three factors: (self) goals, (self) monitoring, and willpower (Baumeister 2002).   
(Self) goals are desired outcomes/ideals individuals establish (Baumeister 2002).  Goals can direct attention, 
mobilize efforts, increase persistence, and motivate coping strategies (Latham and Locke 1991).  For example, in 
dieting, one determines the ideal body weight, but with influence from colleagues.  Similarly, performance 
standards, quotas (amounts of work/production), time limits or budgets for completing tasks influence one’s goals.  
Publicly stated (self) goals are more effective in inducing self-control than privately self-articulated ones (Latham 
and Locke 1991).     
(Self) monitoring involves systematic information gathering about one’s behaviors and comparing actual states to 
ideal standards.  For example, people attempting to achieve a particular bodyweight must weigh themselves (Linde 
et al. 2005).  Self-monitoring is critical because it allows one to obtain information to regulate behavior (Baumeister 
2002).  For example, when school children failed to monitor their performance on math materials, time spent on-task 
and the average number of mathematical problems completed decreased (Sagotsky et al. 1978).  In the workplace, 
(self) monitoring can be achieved by providing controlees with instruments (e.g., clocks to monitor how fast they 
work) and inducements to perform monitoring.   
Willpower is the most important element of self-control (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996).  It refers to one’s 
capacity to regulate thought/affect/behavior/attention despite resistance created by inclinations, desires, or external 
distractions (Job et al. 2010).  Individuals demonstrate willpower by persevering, showing passion for and 
displaying positive attitudes to long-term goals while sacrificing immediate gratification (Hagger et al. 2010).   
Willpower is likened to a muscle (Muraven and Baumeister 2000).  After protracted use, willpower muscles become 
fatigued- a state called ‘ego depletion,’ whereupon the self loses control.  If one suffers from numerous stressors 
during the day, one is less likely to perform work effectively- the stressors drain self-control.  However, ego 
depletion does not occur suddenly and the body responds before fatigue becomes insurmountable (Baumeister et al. 
2007).  As with muscles, the body knows when fatigue is approaching and sends signals.  The body then adjusts to 
cope with increasing fatigue.  For example, people about to lose self-control deliberately give into ‘safe’ impulses 
before self-control is exhausted.  They may deliberately violate their diet, and indulge in sweets, saving their little 
remaining self-control to avoid confrontation with their boss (Lisjak and Lee 2014).  Similarly, with sufficient 
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incentive, self-control fatigued individuals can muster a burst of self-control by tapping into additional self-control 
reserves in the same way fatigued individuals employ adrenaline to provide a last burst of energy (Beedie and Lane 
2012).  Hence, it is not just availability, but whether individuals are willing to or can allocate willpower when 
needed that matters for self-control (Hagger et al. 2010).   
Relating Organizational Self-control to Other Control Modes 
The above suggests a revision of our thinking of the relationship between organizational self-control and other 
control modes.  Recent research demonstrates control modes are not isolated.  Instead, they influence each other.  
For example, formal control can be applied to create and direct clan control (Chua et al. 2012).  Similarly, we argue 
formal and clan control can be applied to shape organizational self-control.   
Within interpretive sociology, humans have agency- the ability to obey, or reject almost all structures enacted on 
them (Giddens, 1984).  In cases where individuals cannot enact agency (e.g., Nazi prison camps)(Giddens, 1984), 
individuals shortly thereafter die.  Indeed, conscious deliberation, acting against impulses, following the “spirit” of 
rules, or resisting external pressure demonstrates people have agency; even though these behaviors account for a 
small portion of daily behaviors, they significantly impact people (Baumeister et al. 2008).     
Figure 1 presents our model.  We argue formal and clan controls (hereafter called external controls) can encourage 
individuals to act in particular ways.  External controls can influence individuals by shaping (self) goals, facilitating 
(self) monitoring, and tapping willpower.  That external controls shape individual goals (arrow ○1 ) and facilitate 
self-monitoring (arrow ○2 ) is widely recognized (Jensen and Meckling 1994).  For example, controllers shape 
controlees’ motivations and goals by using rhetoric, or providing role models for controlees to emulate (Kark and 
Van Dijk 2007); controllers improve controlee self-monitoring by providing feedback to  allow controlees’ inputs 
adjustment, and improve understanding of how inputs relate to outcomes  (Merchant 1982). 
However, what is not well recognized is that controls can tap into controlees’ willpower (arrow ○3 ), draining it, and 
causing control loss.  This explains why controls malfunction.  Personal self-control research consistently 
documents the ego-depleting ability of even common, everyday controls.  For example, peer groups will lower 
individual willpower except in cases where the entire clan has high self-control (Dzhogleva and Lamberton 2014).  
Having others in project teams who can do allocated tasks (Fitzsimons and Finkel 2011), or setting up tasks to be 
interdependent (Hamedani et al. 2013) similarly reduces willpower and hence self-control.  Formal or clan control 
that induces stress (Chan and Wan 2012), makes controlees busy (Joosten et al. 2014), or deprive controlees of sleep 
(Christian and Ellis 2011) reduce willpower and hence self-control.  Furthermore, willpower can be drained by non-
control factors, such as inefficient or unnecessary processes (arrow ○4 ) (Finkel et al. 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Controls Model 
Willpower is unusual as in the short term, only food and rest can have positive effects.  Food restores blood sugar 
levels, an effective biological proxy for self-control (Baumeister et al. 1998).  In the long-term, training improves 
willpower, as training enhances muscle strength (Baumeister et al. 2006).  Given our focus on external controls’ 
influence on self-control, we collapse those short- and long-term measures for enhancing willpower in Figure 1 as 
Food/rest/training.  Other direct influences, including external controls, are willpower drains, because they cause 
one to exercise willpower muscles.  
Food/rest
/training 
○3  Drain (-) 
○2  Enhance (+) 
○1  Enhance (+) 
Formal control 
Clan control 
Willpower 
Self-goals 
Self-monitoring 
Controlee performance 
Willpower 
drains 
○5 Eliminate/ reduce (-) 
External controls  Self-control  
○4 Drain (-) 
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Overall, external controls influence all aspects of self-control, which then affect controlee performance.  While 
external controls facilitate (self) goals and (self) monitoring, they simultaneously drain willpower by exercising self-
control muscles.  However, external controls can also remove drains on willpower (arrow ○5 ).  For example, one can 
apply formal controls to decrease perceived uncertainty and ambiguity in offshore IT projects (Wiener et al. 2015).  
In Figure 1, three arrows are drawn larger (○3 , ○4 , ○5 ), representing this research’s focus and paths underexplored. 
METHODOLOGY 
We followed a case research approach (Yin 2003).  Data on organizational self-control was serendipitously collected 
as part of a larger project examining the adoption of a control mechanism in a manufacturer (“MassCo”).  The 
methodology followed is an incremental, theory-building approach whereby two researchers generated and 
augmented insights about organizational self-control by iterating between theory and data (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Research Site 
MassCo designs and manufactures wireless communication products for worldwide markets, with headquarters in 
Taiwan and factories in Asia.  It employs about 1500 employees worldwide.  Given its distributed factories in Asia, 
a center was established to coordinate production.  The Center comprises 45 engineers working in an open-plan 
office responsible for production planning and pilot production of new products.  The Center enacts a high 
proportion of organizational self-control.  Consider how professional autonomy was exercised by an engineer: 
We don’t have a fixed schedule…I may receive a phone call from the shop floor at any time…You need to judge it 
yourself and see whether it’s critical or not.  (Mechanical engineer) 
Unsatisfactory yield rates (i.e., ratios of good units produced) led MassCo to seek better control of production 
processes.  One new control enacted was the Manufacturability Readiness Review (MRR).  This was a checklist of 
pilot production processes encapsulated in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and was the research’s focus.  The checklist 
was introduced as part of a program to streamline pilot production processes.  In the process, pilot production 
preparation was compared against MRR items.  One then checked off items after processes were executed.  Once all 
processes were executed, the spreadsheets were passed on to MassCo’s production sites for volume production.  If 
projects resulted in volume production problems and engineers failed to execute and check off corresponding MRR 
items, the engineers would be ranked no higher than the 60th percentile. 
Data Collection  
The first author was invited by MassCo to study the MRR adoption.  Because the MRR mainly covered surface 
mount technology (SMT), and mechanical and product engineering, the first author focused on getting information 
from these sections.  Data collection employed a cross-case sampling approach- only one case is presented here due 
to space constraints.  Project Alpha was nominated by a senior technical manager who facilitated the adoption 
during this project.  Data were collected within one month after project completion.  Our focus on organizational 
self-control emerged as we noticed engineers voluntarily monitoring their own performance and set challenging 
goals for themselves.   
We collected data through interviews (the principal method), internal documents, and site visits over a seven-month 
period.  The first author conducted semi-structured interviews with interviewees from different levels 
(management/non-management) and engineering sections.  Questions were asked about interviewees’ positions and 
roles, project control/coordination, and the MRR enacted (e.g., facilitation, performance standards, monitoring, 
reward/punishment).  Interviews, lasting between 1 and 2 hours, were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Totally, 
11 interviews with 8 interviewees were conducted (Table 1). 
 Title Industry tenure  
(in years) 
Company tenure (in 
years) 
# Interviews 
Management Center Director 23 13 2 
Senior technical manager 12 4 3 
Sectional head of Mechanical 
engineering 
7 7 1 
Case Alpha Project manager 11 10 1 
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SMT engineer 12 3 1 
Mechanical engineer 7 6 1 
Product engineer 11 4.5 1 
R&D engineer 3 2 1 
Total                                                                                                                                                    11 
Table 1. Background Information of Interviewee 
Control documents collected included MRR checklists, meeting minutes, orientation/training materials, engineering 
change requests, and email communication.  We also reviewed engineering design drawings, presentation slides and 
other project documents.  The documents helped illuminate and clarify earlier insights drawn from interviews.  
Time-stamped documents also helped establish when events actually occurred. 
During site visits, the first author observed site layouts, and participant interaction/action.  Site visits to MassCo’s 
headquarters and assembly lines/cells in Taiwan were arranged before interviews started.  Field notes were taken, 
including notes on informal conversations, site drawings, researcher reflections, and questions to be pursued. 
Data Analysis 
With regard to self-control, we coded data segments as (self) goals when engineers perceived they had substantial 
influence in determining goals or when they expected more from themselves than goals set by others.  For example, 
engineers strived to complete tasks far earlier before assigned deadlines.  Absence of (self) goals was demonstrated 
by engineers’ lack of project-related goals/direction, or mere compliance because of the concern of punishment or 
personal loss.  
(Self) monitoring requires engineers be aware of their performance levels and be critical of themselves when 
performance is not up to standards.  Evidence was coded as (self) monitoring when engineers gathered cues about 
their behaviors/performance, tracked deviations and strived to come up with solutions.  For example, engineers 
observed a recurrent problem and suggested its inclusion into a checklist.  A lack of (self) monitoring was 
demonstrated when engineers avoided feedback or would not link individual performance to project goals.   
We assessed engineers’ willpower by assessing their personal resources levels (e.g., energy, memory capacity, time, 
positive emotions) and willingness to deploy resources to complete tasks.  We considered data evidence of 
willpower when engineers had resources and applied them to finish whatever they started, or worked hard to 
conquer challenges.  For example, engineers had rights to question schedules, and negotiate for more time for their 
tasks.  Absence of willpower was demonstrated by engineers’ perceived fatigue, negative affect, and perceived 
difficulty with completing tasks.   
Controllers enact a portfolio of controls, rather than a single control mode (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003).  
Cognizant of this, we coded data for evidence of formal and clan control.  Formal controls were documented and 
instituted by management (Jaworski 1988).  They were identified if mechanisms specified desired 
outcomes/behaviors as policies/rules for engineers to engage in.  For example, a target specifying yield rates of no 
lower than 92% or a plan that identified sequences to be followed would be classified as a formal control.  Clan 
controls were identified if mechanisms were instituted by a group of individuals and relied on shared 
norms/values/beliefs to regulate behaviors.  For example, that multiple team members articulated a belief in 
punctuality would be identified as a clan control.   
Consonant with our theorizing, we established a category of willpower drains (non-control factors).  For example, 
designers’ disrespect increased engineers’ perceived difficulties with doing their job.  Such disrespect is not a 
control, because it is not enacted to encourage controlees to complete tasks (Kirsch 1997). 
FINDINGS 
At MassCo, designers dominated engineers.  Interactions between these two groups usually involved engineers 
seeking information from designers.  Few designers sought engineers’ opinions, even on matters clearly in the 
engineering domain such as engineering tests or production.   
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…I felt like having no power to make any decision… The R&D meddled in things... For important issues they would 
step in and made decisions for us (Mechanical engineer).   
Manufacturing engineering requires knowledge of design and manufacturing (Lamancusa et al. 1997).  Particularly, 
engineers’ proactive involvement in the design process is important (Ward et al. 1994).  According to the MRR, an 
expanded role was expected for engineers—they were supposed to audit product designs.  The expanded role 
required engineers to challenge product design based on their professional judgment.   
We revealed many design problems using the MRR…we hoped the checklist would generate pressure on the R&D 
designers through a thorough evaluation of their design… (Senior Technical Manager) 
This challenged the status quo where designers had hierarchical power over engineers.  The expanded role 
necessitated engineers had access to more information.  An engineer commented, 
…The R&D designer wouldn’t give the engineering drawing to you without being asked…as far as I recalled, only 
one in ten projects would the R&D designer inform me before I asked. (Mechanical engineer) 
The expanded role also required designers to surrender some of their prerogatives and develop a healthy respect for 
engineers.  The following quote is indicative of designers’ lack of trust in engineers. 
…we would test a product with the product engineer, write up a SOP for them to follow…in the beginning, we would 
do the testing to show them how… oversee how they do it until they get familiar with the process… (Designer) 
Project Alpha 
Project Alpha was commissioned by a Fortune 500 company, a new client to MassCo.  The project schedule was 
extremely tight.   
Even the client’s international purchase officer in Taiwan considered on-time completion to be impossible. (Project 
manager)   
The senior technical manager, Clark, volunteered to help implement the MRR in Project Alpha.  Clark was known 
for his emphasis on punctuality and nicknamed “Clock” by engineers.  He was among the MRR architects and had 
the authority to settle MRR-related disputes. 
The MRR was developed by a team [including Clark].  They have good knowledge of its spirit…Clark is fully 
responsible for the implementation…he has the power to ask for engineers’ compliance... (Center Director) 
Formal control.  Project Alpha was one of the first projects to pilot the MRR.  Confusion surrounded engineers’ 
new role and MRR implementation.  Clark clarified the confusion and told engineers to exercise independent 
judgment.  An SMT engineer recalled:  
The MRR was originally designed for [a product line]…Clark told us if there’s anything irrelevant, we could raise 
it…we discussed and proposed suggestions… (SMT engineer) 
When disputes/problems with the MRR arose, Clark allowed engineers to individually reinterpret and adapt MRR 
items to situations.   
I wouldn’t be more knowledgeable than mechanical or product engineers when it came to their specialized domains.  
They told me what to add to the checklist and then I did it accordingly… (Senior Technical Manager) 
While the schedule was tight, because the MRR was new, Clark relaxed many controls.  For example, when 
engineers did not fill in the MRR properly, Clark did not go through formal processes.  Instead, he reminded them 
through friendly emails or corridor talks. 
…Clark only occasionally intervened.  Like when I missed some details or forgot to check off some items, Clark 
would send a reminder or chatted with me about it. (Product engineer) 
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Clark also solicited support for MRR implementation.  He invited the project manager to MRR meetings.  The 
project manager attended most meetings and perceived the MRR would benefit the project because it “provided a 
platform for discussion” between engineers and designers.  After the meetings, he demanded designers to respond to 
issues raised by engineers.  Feedback from designers allowed engineers to monitor and evaluate their actions.   
The project manager demanded the R&D to respond to us.  They had to provide feedback to issues we raised.  If the 
design really couldn’t be changed, we had to negotiate a solution with R&D.  Action had to be taken.  (SMT 
engineer) 
Clan control.  The MRR checklist was placed on a shared server accessible to project members.   On its cover page 
was expected and actual times for finishing particular tasks.  Although expected times were mainly determined from 
the overall project schedule, engineers could raise concerns and negotiate new schedules.  The following quote 
demonstrated engineers’ right to question the schedule.   
...the expected time was not firm…like the mechanical engineer needed extra time for getting a fixture…we 
negotiated... (Product engineer) 
Further, engineering problems were expected to be solved and reported within one week.  Publicity associated with 
the checklist put the engineers under each other’s scrutiny and made them aware lateness could cause chain effects 
impacting the overall project.  Punctuality became a buzzword. 
We could check each other’s schedule, knowing who had been careless filling the doc or lagged behind… (Senior 
Technical Manager) 
(Self) goals.  The expanded role and punctuality norm influenced engineers’ self-standards positively.  Engineers 
accepted the role, and considered it important to their work.  When difficult problems occurred, they persisted in 
addressing them.  The product engineer recalled one event where he kept working on a design defect: 
… [One bug] persisted…we judged it as a design issue.  They [R&D designers] first were not persuaded and argued 
it couldn’t be the cause.  We kept testing it with many different methods. (Product engineer)  
While most tasks were allocated a week to complete, engineers decided to impose a more challenging goal.  One 
engineer recalled: 
We did [the pilot run] multiple times.  Whenever it got done, I produced a report, usually within 3 days.  (SMT 
engineer) 
(Self) monitoring.  Because the project manager requested designers to respond to engineers, information flow 
between the two groups improved.  Engineers used information from designers to better execute tasks.  This 
demonstrated (self) monitoring, because engineers were monitoring their own actions to determine how they could 
be improved.  For example, mechanical engineers used designers’ engineering drawings to analyze component 
tolerance and requested design changes to prevent component interference.  In another example, engineers raised 
issues about a shielding cover design which increased production risks.  This showed engineers being aware and 
critical of their own actions. 
In some cases, the MRR failed to consider the project’s critical elements.  An engineer reflected on his experiences 
in other projects to suggest items to be included in the MRR: 
I suggested the addition of two or three items to the [MRR] checklist…I’d encountered several problems with 
packaging and labeling...With them being included, we could prevent them. (Mechanical engineer) 
Willpower.  Although engineers had new responsibilities as a result of the expanded role, they were intrinsically 
motivated to apply the MRR and considered it the right way to get their job done.  
We started the manufacturability check at [an early stage].  If we could, we would have done it much earlier… I 
didn’t think it increased our workload.  (Product engineer) 
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Engineers perceived the checklist reduced memory burden and complemented their experiences.  It increased 
engineers’ motivation by reducing mistakes and reworking. 
The checklist reminded us of important things which we stayed alert and paid attention to... it’s difficult to 
remember details...mistakes creep in if we rely only on memory… (Mechanical engineer) 
The MRR checklists were also made sharable and accessible to project members.  This allowed members to use 
them for their own purposes. 
…in the past our report wasn’t well integrated…there’s information loss during integration…now the project 
manager, layout people, R&D could simply use the checklists on their own. (SMT engineer) 
Furthermore, although the project was time-deprived, engineers felt they were supported and eligible to negotiate for 
more resources to perform their tasks. 
…didn’t feel much time pressure.  Management set aside other big projects…schedules of several smaller projects 
were renegotiated…(Product engineer) 
Outcomes.  Project Alpha outcomes were positive.  First, Project Alpha was completed two weeks earlier.  The 
client was impressed by the team’s detailed interim reports and product quality.   
The project manager and designers attributed project success partially to engineers’ timely identification of design 
defects.  Designers had a healthy respect for engineers.  
…checked what their suggestions were and modified the product.  Or at least I explained to them when the design 
couldn’t be changed.  (R&D designer) 
Second, engineers felt empowered to make decisions about product design. 
...If an issue might cause the yield rate to drop under a certain level, we had the power to block this product. (SMT 
engineer) 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The control literature generally fixates on control modes and mechanisms.  Thus, what is examined as a control is a 
meeting, a performance review, or a ritual (Kirsch 1996; Nidumolu and Subramani 2003).  Our research highlights 
how controls are enacted is as important as what the controls are.  In Project Alpha, the MRR was used to control 
engineers.  However, engineers themselves updated information in the MRR, worked out details of their new role 
from a framework the facilitator provided, and developed their own understanding and aspirations of it in relation to 
others.  For example, engineers were aware lateness in their tasks would cause problems for others and tried to stay 
ahead of schedule.  When problems turned up, engineers addressed them directly and swiftly.  For example, an 
engineer creatively checked a product defect to reveal its root cause and persuaded designers to change design.  
Finally, engineers delivered the project earlier with satisfactory product quality (Table 2).  
Concepts  Data from Project Alpha 
Formal 
control  
• Facilitator clarified the new role to reduce task conflicts 
• Facilitator allowed engineers to adapt the MRR to fit the situation 
• When engineers underperformed, facilitator avoided resorting to formal power  
• Facilitator invited project manager to meetings to solicit his support  
• Project manager (PM) demanded designers’ feedback for engineers 
Clan control • Engineers held punctuality as a shared norm 
• Engineers respected schedule and made it available to each other 
(Self) goals • Engineers accepted the new role and persisted in handling defects 
• Engineers set higher goals (complete tasks before allotted deadlines) 
(Self) 
monitoring 
• Engineers used designers’ feedback to adjust their behaviors 
• Engineers suggested adaptation of the MRR checklists 
Willpower   • Engineers considered following the MRR as the right way to get their job done  
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• Engineers thought the MRR reduced memory burden and highlighted critical issues 
• Engineers felt supported and had the access to more resources 
Project 
deliverables 
• Project ended two weeks earlier 
• PM & designers attributed success partly to engineers’ identification of design defects 
Satisfaction • Engineers satisfied with power in making decisions on product design 
Table 2. Case Summary 
Theoretical Implications 
The case illustrates how control enactment encourages organizational self-control which, in turn, facilitates project 
performance.  In the project, engineers were controlled by the MRR.  However, the impact of that control, 
interacting with other controls, led to organizational self-control.  Figure 2 illustrates how organizational self-control 
arose in Project Alpha.   
(Self) goals.  The MRR was employed to align engineers with organizational goals.  In Project Alpha, the MRR was 
employed to bring engineers into the decision-making process.  For example, the MRR was used to encourage 
individual interpretation of pilot production processes.  When engineers deviated from MRR recommendations, they 
were not necessarily blamed.  Deviations highlighted problems needing discussion and correction.  Because auditing 
processes and task allocation were jointly decided, engineers accepted auditing as their responsibility (arrow ○1 ).   
Organizational self-control is also about overcoming selfish impulses/goals and doing what benefits the collective.  
In Project Alpha, the senior manager fostered norms conducive for collaboration (e.g., punctuality, respect for 
agreed schedules), and helped engineers internalize them (arrow ○2 ).  For example, he set up a public server for 
engineers to check each other’s schedule; he himself acted as a role model, demonstrating the importance of 
punctuality; when someone failed to complete tasks on time, he showed individualized concern (e.g., corridor talks).  
The collaborative norms buttressed engineers’ pursuit of self-goals within the context of collective goals.  Engineers, 
therefore, strived to accomplish tasks within a more challenging timeframe (three days) than the norm of one week.   
(Self) monitoring.  The MRR was applied to craft communication channels (arrow ○3 ).  An important condition of 
communication is one sees the other as competent/reliable/credible (Burgoon et al. 1999), and one way to enhance 
one’s credibility is to obtain influential endorsement (Erdogan 1999).  In Project Alpha, the senior technical 
manager invited the project manager to MRR meetings and sought his endorsement of the MRR and engineers who 
used it to collect information.  When deviations arose, designers and the project manager were informed.  Designers 
then responded to engineers’ queries.  The MRR became useful for collecting information for conceiving creative 
solutions, and engaging designers in communication and joint problem-solving.   
Willpower drains.  The MRR was applied as an overarching control to reduce control conflicts, thereby saving 
engineers’ energy/mental capacity (arrow ○4 ).  The MRR was applied to change the current roles.  Existing controls 
thus were relaxed to accommodate changes.  Tolerances for mistakes increased, and redundant controls were 
relaxed.  For example, failure filling in the MRR did not lead to formal sanction; engineers got a chance to amend it.  
Finally, external controls helped remove willpower drains (e.g., memory burdens and inequalities) (arrow ○5 ).  The 
MRR was used as a memory aid to ensure pilot production elements were ready.  Because the MRR relieved 
engineers of cognitive burdens, they had excess capacity to use to better the project.   For example, engineers 
reflected on past experiences and suggested improvements to packaging/labeling, previously not included in the 
MRR.  How the MRR was applied removed oppression and gave engineers power to conduct their role.  The dotted 
arrow (Figure 2) shows willpower drains’ effects are removed as external controls eliminate the drains. 
 It is usually assumed control is achieved once appropriately designed mechanisms are applied.  We demonstrate it 
depends on whether controlees embrace controls.  Figure 2 depicts how external controls take on psychological 
significance in controlees.  In Project Alpha, organizational self-control arises due to control enactment that allows 
controlees to respond to contingencies and to codify/document local best practices.  These controls thus are 
intelligible/useful without unnecessary information overloading controlees, thereby conserving willpower.  The 
conserved willpower allows controlees to better align their own goals with controllers’, and monitor their own 
progress.  Organizational self-control thus mediates external control’s influence on controlee performance.   
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Figure 2. How Organizational Self-control is Enacted in Project Alpha 
Practical Implications 
Our research highlights three issues surrounding control enactment.  First, control enactments are also performed by 
controlees.  Controlees, considering control useful, are more likely to allow the control to positively influence their 
behavior.  Therefore, controls are more effective when they are bilaterally created.   
Second, our research reveals how managers helps enact controlees’ organizational self-control.  Chua et al. (2012) 
argue clan control is fostered in projects via formal control.  This research extends that thinking by arguing 
organizational self-control is fostered via formal and clan control.  Formal control shapes organizational self-control 
either directly, or indirectly via clans.   
Particularly, formal control shapes organizational self-control indirectly by reshaping norms, which are then 
internalized by clan members.  In this research, two factors affected norm internalization.  First, norms’ alignment 
with individual goals is crucial.  Second, when norms are performed to support individual autonomy, they tend to 
become a part of oneself (Ryan and Deci 2000).  In Project Alpha, the besting dates norm was internalized, because 
individuals could negotiate schedules and reinterpret MRR items.     
Third, formal control conserves controlee willpower by relieving cognitive burdens and conflicts.  In Project Alpha, 
the checklist was used as a memory aid to routinize checks engineers previously kept in their heads and freed their 
minds to perform tasks beneficial for the project (e.g., identify/correct design faults).  It was also used to coordinate 
between project members because the checklist promoted information flow, helping articulate 
expectations/requirements.  The managerial moral thus is parsimony and carefulness in deciding what controls to 
enact.  Judicious consideration of how controls appear to controlees helps improve performance. 
This study has limitations.  First, we collected data retrospectively.  Yet, we conducted multiple interviewees within 
one month after project completion.   Also, we collected documents for triangulation.  Second, we focus on 
organizational self-control initiated by management through a formal checklist.  This may limit our generalizability 
to organizational self-control initiated by mechanisms in other contexts.  While our research may not be 
generalizable to a population, it is likely generalizable to theory (Lee and Baskerville 2003).  Future research should 
consider multiple case studies to identify additional contextual factors.   
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